Criticizing the Myth of The Raging Womb: Hysteria’s Impact on Women – Muath Alomaireen

For the past ages, and those to come, the concept of hysteria was and still is one of the most influential misconceptions in the history of scientific development. This concept, in its formation since Pharaonic times, in its establishment with the Greeks, in its demonization by the Church in the Middle Ages, and in its scientific and cultural roots over the subsequent centuries, revealed a pattern of male ideological control over the writing of medical history, as Dr. Esther Fischer-Homberger stated in her article Hysteria and Misogyny: “Where hysteria is diagnosed, misogyny is not far away.”¹ In this case, the gap between them is of great historical significance; not every recorded evidence of the concept of hysteria will stem in evidence of misogyny; meaning that all historical inputs of hysteria are ultimately exposed to the interpretation of the historians according to their backgrounds, and they are given the authority to exposing it or removing it from the historical context. Because the historiography of hysteria is conceptual, the subject of historical study here is not within the same events, but it is the concepts contained therein. Abdallah Laroui called this method of historiography “Conceptual History”, in which “These do not write the history of individuals (heroes, kings, ministers etc.), but rather the history of a group (social class, nations, groups of people). These groups are often not historically recognized and are not seen worthy of consideration, examination and investigation, unless they embody a valuable idea (prejudice, civilization, mind, freedom, justice, etc.).”² Through this description, we can see how the historiography of hysteria is conceptual, as the concept of “gender hierarchy” (or Gender Stratification) has played a pivotal role in the creation of misogyny against women from the formation of the concept of hysteria to the present day.

This concept, as the result of age-long western ideologies rooted in misogyny, brings us to the heart of the historiographical issue described by Professor Abdul Kareem Inayat: “The question of the evolution of Western thinking in its history is one of the controversial issues that shaped the contemporary philosophical landscape, on the basis that history of thought is not a purely scientific task, as much as it is a field of application of preconceived philosophical principles in the interpretation of this very idea; so it was rightly said: the history of thought is itself a thought, or the history of philosophy is in itself a philosophy.”³ Abdallah Laroui also stated that one of the drawbacks of history is that “it is written with preconceived ideas to justify beliefs that are not derived from the material studied. The writer deceives the reader; he deceives himself, when he presents the preconceived idea as if it were an inductive result.”⁴ Here, we reformulate the problem posed in the form of questioning whether misogyny exists in the historical context of hysteria or not. How can we be sure that the problem is in the exclusion of an existing misogynistic ideology, rather than an imagined misogyny just to support the narrative of feminist criticism?

In this case, when we see that the problem is generated by the interpretation of historical sequences, we have to temporarily stop the wheel of the historical narrative, and to go back to the action of reading itself, looking for the flaws in the hermeneutical process of conceptual history. That means that we have to go back to the language and the mental processes associated with it; because the preconceived perceptions, which frame cognition and affect objective reading, lie at the heart of language as a mental phenomenon in its basis. If we are to demonstrate the impact of gendered concepts in reading the history of hysteria, we must first reveal the role of the linguistic influence of hysteria in shaping these preconceived perceptions. In her article, Dr. Fischer-Homberger referred to the meaning of the Greek words Hystra and Hystero; as the first word (Hystra) means the “womb”, linguistically imposing that any hysteria is specifically referring to female hysteria. The second word (Hystero) means “latter”, and in its many combinations, it refers to: “lateness”, “shortcoming”, or “retardation”(place, position, and quality).⁵ In this case, language does not only perform a semantic function in communicative contexts denoting a specific behavioral phenomenon; it also plays a mental role in shaping perception based on the gender hierarchy (feminist insufficiency versus male superiority) imposed by the word, in other words: misogyny that is linguistically rooted in hysteria, has found its consciousness through language.

Here, the question of language and cognition automatically arises: How can we confidently say that mental concepts have a direct influence on the formation of cognition?

Well, it’s because words have an ability to carry the legacy of their cultural uses in society, and because man is by nature a social being, he inherits this cultural load through the process of acquiring the language of society to form his cognitive framework. And for that reason; we say that language is the gateway to perception in an individual. Superficially, albeit not wrong, we say that the cultural references for the interpretation of the perception, inherited and acquired from lived life experiences, begin and end with language. In his study on cultural semiotics, Professor Abdullah Buraimi defined language as: “Every system that facilitates communication between two and more people. Art is one type of these languages that in turn branches into other languages such as literature, cinema and fine arts.”⁶ With this definition, it becomes clear to us the extent of the cognitive and communicative impact of language on the individual. The word, with all the history associated with its linguistic uses, its general cultural connotations, its artistic functions, and even its own unique contexts, extends to form the medium of any mental process when hearing or reading the word.

For example, the word “Coffee” is a rich word in its multiple associations, and carries a central cultural heritage in many societies, and at the same time, this heritage is radically different between each one of these societies; from the color of coffee to the ways it is prepared, served and drunk. But what interests us here is the psychological impact of cognition through previous experiences of drinking coffee, as there are those who cannot tolerate a large amount of caffeine, and for this reason, they only drink decaffeinated coffee. On the other hand, there are those who cannot start their day without a morning dose of caffeine. We are now faced with two completely different experiences with coffee, and both experiences will leave their mark on the word itself, because what the word “coffee” evokes in the mind of the first person will not be the same as what is in the mind of the second person. If a word like “coffee” has this much complexity, then how about emotionally charged words like “family”? Or politically charged words like “states”? The energy found in such words can mentally evoke the smallest personal details, from traumatic experiences to living conditions. What passes through the mind, whether conscious or unconscious of these details, cannot help but generate an influenced meaning; and that is because of the comprehensive semiotic nature of language. 

The American philosopher Richard Rorty, influenced by Wilfrid Sellars’ psychological nominalism, argued that “consciousness begins with language.”⁷ But if we go along with Rorty’s statement, we face an epistemological complication by placing language over reality. In such a case, how can we recognize and acknowledge reality if our perception itself was influenced by other factors (biological, psychological, and cultural)? And can we tell the reality and essence of things through these influences?

Rorty tells us that this is impossible, and that we cannot get out of the “human condition” with its three basic influences in order to realize the truth of things in reality. Humankind cannot go beyond their genetic makeup, they cannot transcend above their psychological state, and they cannot be free from the restrictions of language, whether mental or communicative. And here’s the final blow, even if we can assume—for argument’s sake— that there are those who have the ability to overcome, transcend, and free themselves from what restricts the human condition, and are able to see things around them for what they are; they will only be able to convey the truth to us by using language as a communicative tool. With that, we go back to square one, because linguistic communication will require the interpretation of the receiving party, which returns us to the basic influences on perception. This fact, which we have assumed for the sake of argument, that someone was able to know, will lose its essence during the linguistic communication and the only thing that will remain is its traces. 

Similarly, when it comes to our relationship with reality, the German philosopher Ernst Cassirer says: “No longer in a merely physical universe, man lives in a symbolic universe. Language, myth, art, and religion are parts of this universe. They are the varied threads which weave the symbolic net, the tanked web of human experience. All human progress in thought and experience refines upon and strengthens this net. No longer can man confront reality immediately; he cannot see it, as it were, face to face. Physical reality seems to recede in proportion as man’s symbolic activity advances. Instead of dealing with the things themselves man is in a sense constantly conversing with himself. He has so enveloped himself in linguistic forms, in artistic imagism in mythical symbols or religious rites that he cannot see or know anything except by the interposition of this artificial medium. His situation is the same in the theoretical as in the practical sphere.”⁸

If we had nothing left of reality but a trace, and if our relationship with it was indirect, in that case; the most important question here is something we can’t move forward without answering… “What is reality?”

From a philosophical linguistic point of view, we say that the two words of this question have the philosophical ability to present themselves as two completely separate questions, where the first question is the “question of essentialism”, and the other question is the “question of reality”.

The Encyclopedia of the Basic Concepts in Human Sciences and Philosophy defines ‘Essence’ as: “The language of what is said in the answer to what is, and refers in its ontological significance to the essence; the special and necessary nature of the thing, on which its existence is based, and comes in exchange for presentation… Accordingly, the primacy of essence over existence was recognized, after which the condition that it is possible, and the principle of its realization.”⁹ The concept of essence in its distinction between the apparent and the inner goes on: “The consideration of the universe, man, existence and everything in it in general is formed of two parts, one of which is superficial, external and represents only appearance and surface, neither real nor true. While the other is mystical, internal and symbolizes essence and depth, and represents all truth”¹⁰ But if we look at the question of identity, we will face the same epistemological problem again.

How can we perceive the essence of something through language? We are simply unable to, because language as a medium cannot bear philosophical work in the search for what things are. And because different linguistic frameworks produce multiple facts of the same reality, philosophizing in this case is useless. In the event that the essence monopolizes the truth, the result of philosophizing will be crucial in claiming to know the truth. Returning to hysteria, it becomes clear that the problem of gender hierarchy is a problem of identity, as the belief in feminist shortcomings results from a philosophical work on the nature of women, as opposed to a belief in male superiority, which in turn resulted from a philosophical work on the nature of men. In other words, we say that gender hierarchy, as an idea based on gender differentiation, requires an essential criterion of preference between male and female. As a result of the prevailing philosophical belief that the essence lies in the interior, and the knowledge of the truth of something lies in the answer to the question of what it is, it became obligatory for the philosopher to create this essence. And as we have already mentioned the impossibility of perceiving the essence through language, we said that the philosopher in this case “creates the essence” rather than “reveal” it. Meaning that the philosopher has created a mental concept of “female essence” and “male essence” from language, and then differentiated between the two.

At this point, we cautiously enter a linguistic maze—though it could be seen as some sort of evasion— when we say that the word “essence” is itself a word that has a perceptual effect in the context of gender differentiation. We are not wrong when we say that the first thing that comes to our mind when mentioning the feminine essence is pink, as opposed to the blue color of the masculine essence, this association does not represent a gender problem in itself, but what is problematic in this case is the stereotypical associations themselves as concepts attached to gender. These concepts are not the result of revealing what male and female are, but are insubstantial associations; therefore, we argue that the “question of identity” in the gender question is a false question because it creates an unsolvable philosophical problem. This does not mean denying the existence of differences between male and female; but it is a pragmatic position that does not see any benefit from this philosophical work that improves the life of both sexes in this world. On the contrary, we have seen how gender differentiation and hierarchy contribute to the creation of concepts such as hysteria, and establish misogynistic thoughts and practices through them.

Saying that there are differences between the sexes and then ignoring their value in the differentiation may cause a kind of intellectual anxiety in the modernist mentality that centers on the duality of the top and bottom, as if we are deliberately leaving the truth in the darkness. This is what represents one of the nightmares of the enlightenment project of modernity. The modernist cannot ignore knowledge, which he claims to be the product of science with its neutral and objective methodologies, and therefore he always plays with the scientific disclosure card of what is unknown in the dark, because he believes that this disclosure puts things in their hierarchically correct order, ignoring what everyone below these binaries is exposed to.

In her study on modernity and postmodernism, Dr. Mary Klages stated: “Modernity is fundamentally about order: about rationality and rationalization, creating order out of chaos. The assumption is that creating more rationality is conducive to creating more order, and that the more ordered a society is, the better it will function (the more rationally it will function). Because modernity is about the pursuit of ever-increasing levels of order, modern societies constantly are on guard against anything and everything labeled as ‘disorder,’ which might disrupt order. Thus, modern societies rely on continually establishing a binary opposition between ‘order’ and ‘disorder,’ so that they can assert the superiority of order.”¹¹ Everything that is not white, masculine, healthy, rational, and scientific, becomes a part of disorder and chaos, marginalized in hierarchical dualisms.

According to the French philosopher and theorist Jean-François Lyotard, these modern societies use “grand narratives” that express the practices and beliefs of a particular culture, in order to legitimize hierarchies and preserve the totalitarianism and stability of the system.¹² These narratives play a conceptual role at the heart of culture by rationalizing what is systemic and marginalizing what is not. The system has the unique linguistic authority to impose positive perception on its branches, synonyms and related connotations of words, such as: ethics, rationality, balance, tranquility, etc. In contrast to the negative perception of its opposites, such as: chaos, moral decay, frivolity, recklessness, etc. Once more, we see the linguistic problem here, in that the negative perceptions imposed on disorder in language affected everything that was marginalized according to the modernist standards. Thus, the moral value in modernist thought became centered around the duality of order and chaos, which ensures stability, rather than good and evil, leading to a good and just life for all sectors of society. The concept of moral value in this context legitimizes systemic oppressions against marginalized groups through grand narratives that justify hierarchical dualities. The narrative of feminist inadequacy also gives legitimacy to gender hierarchy, allowing negative perceptions to conceptually embody the female side, making misogyny a systematically legitimate moral and rational practice.

This applies to anyone who represents the “other” in the pathological connotation of the word in modernist thought; when the “other” poses a threat to the stability of the regime only because of its different presence in what is homogenous; the measures taken towards it are guaranteed by the regime’s right to maintain its stability, but the meaning of stability in the modern context does not mean stability by stagnation, but stability by scientific and technological progress and prosperity. Stability of the system in its ideal form to advance development and achieve enlightenment. This image which does not accept the participation of the otherness, has formed during the decades since the Enlightenment, the male-centric European age of science, which forcibly presented itself to the world as the ideal model of progress and development.

In the conclusion of his study entitled alhadatha w ma-baed alhadatha .. taqasi lilmadlulat tatabbe liltahawulat (Modernity and post-modernism…an investigation of meanings and tracking of transformations) Professor of Philosophy, Dr. Muhammad bin Sebaa, wrote: “One of the biggest illusions of modernity is its statement of the perfection of the human mind, which has dominated the world, where modernity has been identified in its most important manifestations, namely rationality and self-realization, so there was a merger between the mind and the self, forming all the cultural elements of modernity, and this is what produced many crises that are mainly due to considering the self as the center of the world. Among its most dangerous aspects were the marginalization of the different other, as well as the emergence of many existential and ecological crises, not to mention the limitation of knowledge in science only, so that other knowledge, especially religious and human knowledge, has become unrecognized, in addition to many other crises.”¹³ Among these crises that forced the world into the hell of wars, genocide and the horrors of colonialism, and among existential and spiritual crises in exploding moral and social values and replacing material values and a culture of consumption, the crisis of knowledge and science in its support of grand narratives is highlighted through the historical context of hysteria. Through this crisis, scientific and academic institutions have played a vital role in the mentality of marginalization and racism; females cannot be freed from the conceptual stigma of hysteria, without breaking apart the science they support. And for this reason, we have elaborated on the foundations of modernist thought in order to reveal the superior intentions behind the hierarchy, and it turns out that the scientific evidence was delusional about proving feminist shortcomings. As mentioned before, the concepts of hysteria are rooted in the depths of language and its cognitive frameworks. The modernist scientist did not objectively discover the objectively limited feminist essence in the laboratory and under the microscope; rather, he/she tried to prove the validity of a concept that was bequeathed to him philosophically through language, in order to maintain the structure of the system, directly or indirectly.

Certainly, there are those who will object and argue that gender hierarchy is based on a cognitive of male superiority (i.e. physiologically eligible). So, the question raised here: Did male superiority gain its legitimacy from the objective scientific field?

This question cannot be answered in its current formulation, because the wording implies a problem in the open superiority criterion. This open criterion of gender differentiation is one manifestation of the question of male and female identity, which requires a revealing answer to the essence of gender. In other words, male superiority cannot be proven “scientifically and objectively” with this formulation that includes a trade-off on the basis of substance, because it is simply a philosophical matter. However, we understood, at a very late stage, the extent to which philosophical concepts, religious beliefs and mythological imaginations penetrated the scientific field in previous eras, and what resulted from this penetration of scientific objectivity from the consolidation of philosophical concepts in the name of science, until philosophical questions became included in the scientific field. Medical historian Ludwig Edelstein tells us that “the theory of the human body is always part of philosophy.”¹⁴ Therefore, all theories concerning the feminist body enter the philosophical sphere in one form or another, since the investigative work of investigating physical phenomena is more philosophical than physiological.¹⁵ This extends to Galen in the Roman Empire, second century AD, who encouraged physicians to study philosophy, and wrote a short text entitled The Best Physician Is Also a Philosopher. He also stressed the importance of philosophizing in order to reveal the “elaborate design of nature.”¹⁶ He said, “The study of the function of different parts of the body is not useful for a physician alone; it is far more useful for a philosopher who strives to gain an integrated understanding of nature.”¹⁷

The text acknowledges that scientific proof of physiological phenomena between the sexes is not impossible. But what is problematic in this case is the huge legacy of non-scientific interpretations of these natural phenomena and their burden on creating an essence for both male and female. Despite all the scientific facts about menstruation, for example, there are still cultural difficulties in correcting the negative perceptions that constitute, through non-scientific interpretations, a philosophical concept of feminine essence. The reason is due to the role played by philosophy in raising the question of essentialism, and then assuming the role of science in trying to answer it, often inspired by fantasies shaping its perception. In the context of anthropological analysis of menstruation, the question of essence has created a kind of spiritual hierarchy between the sexes, as “males in many cultures believe that they are spiritually superior to females, that females are dangerous, profane and vulnerable beings, and that they are untrustworthy. Therefore, the female remains subjugated and enslaved, and often accepts the male justification for maintaining that status.”¹⁸ Misogynistic beliefs are deeply rooted in cultures, inherited through language, rituals, and behaviors. Because science can only be carried out by scholars, the sons of societies who speak their languages, perform their rituals, and practice their behaviors; the problem here becomes the formation of the perceptual framework that observes the given on the basis of the cultural reality normalizing misogyny that society believed in, and accordingly the scientist evaluates evidence according to the scientific paradigm of the time, as seen in the history of scientific development related to the female  body. 

Galen fell into the trap of this philosophical grafting of scientific findings when misogyny found its way into his scientific-anatomical discovery of the reproductive systems of both sexes: “men and women therefore have the same reproductive organs, the difference being that the man’s were on the outside and the woman’s on the inside.”¹⁹ Austrian pediatrician, and historian of medicine, Dr. Erna Lesky pointed out that the duality of reversion and prominence is a duality that goes beyond anatomical description, that it includes the concepts of inadequacy and superiority. For Galen, this prominence represents an advanced stage in the development of the human being, which is as close as possible to idealism. This is unlike reversion, which carries negative connotations of delay and deficiency at the anatomical level.²⁰ We also find that philosophy has crowded out physiology in the question of fertilization as well; it was believed that a woman’s contribution to pregnancy is a secondary contribution only to the place (womb) and nutrition (blood).²¹ Aristotle considered this issue in his theory of semen, saying that semen is superior to blood, that is, the contribution of the father is superior to the mother, resulting in the physiological deficiency of women. Galen, following him, agreed on the deficiency of the female seed, describing it as “thinner”, “colder” and “weaker” than the male seed.²²

The physiological fantasies related to procreation did not end there. Dr. Lensky describes one of the most influential gender concepts in scientific history. “Of all the theories of reproduction in ancient times, no one has been believed throughout the previous millennium as the belief that males are born from the right side of the body and females from the left side.”²³. We find this widespread belief in civilization and extends historically, from ancient Hindu medicine through Galen to eighteenth-century France, where nobles remove their left testicles in order to ensure male offspring.²⁴. Indeed, scientific experiments of the theory of “right and left” in reproduction continued until 1913,²⁵ showing us the continuity of the conceptual impact of gender hierarchy on the scientific method.

In 1873, before entering the medical field, the German neurologist Paul Julius Möbius studied philosophy and theology, and he showed an interest in line with the trends of mental and psychological sciences at the turn of the century, such as sexuality and hysteria, so much so that his controversial 1900 book On the Physiological Idiocy of Women outsold Sigmund Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams. In it, Möbius explains cerebral insufficiency in women compared to men.²⁶ In 1903, he published another work, Contributions to the Theory of Gender Differences, in which he documented the results of a study he conducted on sex and head measurements, from which he concluded, based on the belief in the relationship between head circumference and mental abilities, that a natural man needs a head circumference of at least 53 cm to perform his masculine functions to the fullest, while a woman needs only 51 cm. “With a head circumference of only 51 cm, an individual can be a rational woman, but not a rational man”²⁷ Of course, these findings were not isolated from the influence of the political scene in Europe in the last quarter of the nineteenth century; feminist rights movements emerged across Europe demanding the right to vote and equality with men. Möbius took a tough stance against these rights movements, using a “patriarchal medical tone.”²⁸ He cited the results of his scientific study that women are unable to participate politically and academically due to their limited mental abilities, and that they must get rid of “illusions of equality”²⁹ and focus on maternal functions instead.

When we reflect on this systemic stability of the result of feminist shortcomings throughout the ages and in various forms from the present day perspective, this pattern that was inscribed on the stone of culture, and which penetrated our scientific observations claiming the objectivity of its results, indicates a psychological rather than scientific problem, in the sense that the real problem here is not a methodological problem, but a problem at the heart of the archetype from a point of view relating to Carl Jung. American Psychologist James Hillman says “Our sight, even scientific observation, is unreliable, not just because of the senses and their well-known capacity for sensory illusions, but because of the psychic structures on which it is based. Behind the vision of sense is the vision of the archetypal, and we are unreliable when we lose the inward sight—insight—toward the subjective factor which influences our observations.”³⁰ This factor, this primitive model of the minor woman in our imagination, as long as it lurks in the shadows of language, will find its way into reality through scientific evidence, philosophical argument and religious hermeneutics. When we lose our internal awareness of this factor, it results in a “mixture of observation and fantasy.”³¹ Thus, the result of this historical misogynistic legacy is based on imaginary fallacies.

Talking about the imaginary brings us back to the question of reality and its relationship with language and its philosophy. So, let’s conclude this article from where we began. How can we say that we have different perceptions of reality and the world around us without being completely separated from it and drowning in Solipsism?

On the legitimacy of this question in the context of our conversation here, the context lies in the concept of the Cartesian Theater, which is René Descartes’s theory on the separation of mind from body, in which he says that perceptions are the ideas that appear inside our minds of what is in the outside world. Meaning that the perception of reality from the seats of the Cartesian Theater is subject to mental processing only, and that what you perceive is what your mind presents to you, which may not be similar to what exists outside your perception. If it even exists at all! If we accept this misconception of cognition, then we will find ourselves in front of the dilemma posed in the question, because this separation between the self and the world is the entrance to the subjective maze. However, we will not do so, not to escape the predicament, but because of philosophical projects and scientific research critical of Descartes’ concepts related to cognition, which makes us go beyond this theory and the epistemological problems it generates by simply referring to it.

One of the most important critics of Cartesian Theater is the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty, author of The Phenomenology of Perception, who tells us that the real problem here lies in limiting the cognitive process to the mind in isolation from the body.  For Merleau-Ponty, the body is the anchor of our existence in the world, and it carries our organs that see, hear, smell, taste and feel. Because the selves differ in their physical and mental differences, the result of this cognitive interaction is different for each person even with the constant thing perceived, as in the example of “coffee”. This conclusion proves to us the origin of the difference in our perception of reality on the basis of interactive difference, which we have already said is done through a general linguistic medium, that is, language not only shapes our perception of the world, but also affects our existence embodied in it. This is what paves the way for us to talk about the conclusion of this article: that the presence of women in this world is influenced by the hysterical concept that formed a world for her in which there are phenomenological constraints.

In the conclusion of her study entitled Nietzsche walnuza’a al’unthawia (Nietzsche and Feminism), the professor of Contemporary Philosophy, Atiyat Abu Al-Saud summarized all of the above when she wrote: “In an early essay entitled On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense, Nietzsche asserted that words do not reflect the world; this means that the way we talk about the world is neither the world itself nor a reflection of it; it generates a sense of the reality of the world. In other words, language creates the world. Accordingly, our description of femininity and our talk about the inferiority and contempt of women are nothing but linguistic human creations and not natural facts in women. We can therefore describe language as the “deceptive old witch” who, if used in a different way, can create a new reality that is not linked to a particular gender, whether it is a man or a woman.”³²

We see that the misogynistic legacy significantly influences body politics, particularly the philosophical theory of the woman’s body. This theory reveals the substance problem, but it also creates a prison for the female body. The existence of the world through the female body is restricted by its essence, derived from philosophy, religion, mythology, and science. Therefore, it is crucial to stop chasing the mirage of discovering the essence and turn to the language that created it. And instead of relying on observation and discovery, we should focus on the prototypes that stand behind the female body and its essence.

References:

1. Fischer-Homberger, “Hysterie und Misogynie” p. 122; cf. Altschule, “Venus Ascendant,” in Roots of Modern Psychiatry; J.-M. Bruttin, “Différentes théories sur I’hystérie dans la première moitié du XIX siècle (dissertation, University of Zurich, 1969).
2. عبدالله العروي، “مفهوم التاريخ”، ص ٢٠٧ و ٢٠٨
3. عبدالكريم عنيات، ورقة ‘( روح الأنوار ) و ما-بعد الحداثة’، من كتاب “الحداثة و ما–بعد الحداثة”، ص ٦٩
4. عبدالله العروي، “مفهوم التاريخ”، ص ٢١١
5. James Hillman, “The Myth of Analysis“, see the side note P 253
6. عبدالله بريمي، “السميائيات الثقافية : مفاهيمها و آليات اشتغالها”، ص ٥٦
7. عبدالله بريمي، “السميائيات الثقافية : مفاهيمها و آليات اشتغالها”، ص ٢٨
8. Richard Rorty, Science et solidarité: La vérite sans le pouvoir, p.8.9.
9. نيكول إيفرايرت. دسمدت: “الرمزية و المخيال و الواقعي”، ترجمة سعيد بنكراد، مجلة علامات العدد ٣ السنة الأولى ربيع ١٩٩٥، ص ٧٠
10. Ernest Cassirer. Essai sur I’homme. Paris Minuit, 1975, p.p 43/44.
11. محمد سبيلا – نوح الهرموزي، “موسوعة المفاهيم الأساسية في العلوم الإنسانية و الفلسفة”، ص ٤٢٠
12. محمد جديدي، “الحداثة و ما بعد الحداثة في فلسفة ريتشارد رورتي”، ص ١٩٦ و ١٩٧
13. د. ماري كليجز، بحث ‘المفاهيم الأساسية لما بعد الحداثة’، من كتاب “مابعد الحداثة : دراسات في التحولات الاجتماعية و الثقافية في الغرب”، ص ٢٨
14. د. ماري كليجز، ورقة ‘المفاهيم الأساسية لما بعد الحداثة’، من كتاب “مابعد الحداثة : دراسات في التحولات الاجتماعية و الثقافية في الغرب”، ص ٢٩
15. د. عبدالرزاق بلعقروز، ورقة ‘الاقرار بكونية الحداثية الغربية نحو صرف القول بخصوصيتها’، من كتاب “الحداثة و ما–بعد الحداثة”، ص ٥٥ و ٥٦
16. د. محمد بن سباع، ورقة ‘الحداثة و ما-بعد الحداثة .. تَقَصِي للمدلولات تَتَبّع للتحولات’، من كتاب “الحداثة و ما–بعد الحداثة”، ص ٤٦
17. L. Edelstein, “The History of Anatomy in Antiquity” in Ancient Medicine: selected papers of Ludwig Edelstein, ed. O. and C. L. Temkin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), p. 265.
18. L. Edelstein, “The History of Anatomy in Antiquity” in Ancient Medicine: selected papers of Ludwig Edelstein, ed. O. and C. L. Temkin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), p. 265.
19. Peter Adamson, “Philosophy in The Hellenistic & Roman Worlds“, P 134
20. Galen De usu partium XVII.1.
21. https://mana.net/archives/1545
22. James Hillman, “The Myth of Analysis“, P 238
23. Lesky, “Die Zeugungs- und Vererbungslehre,” P. 184 f.
24. Lesky, “Die Zeugungs- und Vererbungslehren der Antike und ihr Nachwirken,” Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse,XIX (1950), 120.
25. Lesky, “Die Zeugungs- und Vererbungslehre,” PP. 180; Gerlach, “Das Problem des ‘weiblichen Samens,’” p. 188.
26. Lesky, “Die Zeugungs- und Vererbungslehre,” P. 39, 41, 53.
27. Graham, Eternal Eve, p. 41.
28. Lesky, “Die Zeugungs- und Vererbungslehre,” P. 69.
29. https://mana.net/archives/2202
30. https://mana.net/archives/2202
31. P. J. Moebius, Über den physiologischen Schwachsinn des Weibes, 7th ed. (Halle,1905).
32. P. J. Moebius, ” Geschlecht und Kopfgrösse,” Beiträge zur Lehre von den Geschlechts-Unterschieden, No. 5 (Halle, 1903), p. 47.
33. James Hillman, “The Myth of Analysis“, P 245
34. James Hillman, “The Myth of Analysis“, P 245
35. James Hillman, “The Myth of Analysis“, P 237
36. James Hillman, “The Myth of Analysis“, P 239
37. عطيات أبو السعود، ورقة ‘نيتشه و النزعة الأنثوية’، من كتاب “نيتشه و جذور مابعد الحداثة”، ص ١١٤ و ١١٥.

T1655